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COMMENTARY ON PROFESSOR TARLOCK'S PAPER: 
THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON UNITED STATES 
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW 




Good afternoon and Aloha! We are pleased to have the opportunity 
to comment on Professor Tarlock's paper, The Influence of International 
Environmental Law on United States Pollution Control Law. I We 
represent "crossovers" between domestic and international environmental 
law, with Professor Jarman's specialty in domestic law and Professor 
McLaughlin's in international law. Therefore, most of Professor Jarman's 
comments will focus on the roles that states within the United States have 
played in the development and implementation of international 
environmental law. Professor McLaughlin's commentary will cover 
international trade issues. 
In his paper, Professor Tarlock examined the influence of 
international law on three areas of domestic environmental law: (1) 
transboundary air pollution between the United States and Canada under 
the Clean Air Act;2 (2) restrictions imposed by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)3 and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)4.on U.S. pollution law; and (3) application of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)S to extraterritorial pollution prevention 
activities. He used the U.S.-Canada transboundary pollution case study to 
illustrate his theory that, although international law is part of United States 
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1. A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence 0/ International Environmental Law on United States 
Pollution Control Law, 21 VT. L. REv. 759 (1997). 
2. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988). 
3. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened/or signature April 15, 1994, 
pt. II of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994) [hereinafter WTO]. 
4. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, Can-Mex.-U.S., 32I.L.M. 389 
& 605 (entered into force Jan. I, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
5. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-437Od (1988). 
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Professor Jarman discusses a recent lawsuit in Washington State dealing 
with the issue of preemption of U.S. state laws by international treaties to 
supplement Professor Tarlock's points. In addition, she looks at a 
"success story:" a case where one state, Texas, effectively interposed itself 
in the international legal arena to implement the International Convention 
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)6 in a way that 
served the needs of both the United States national government, Caribbean 
nations, and the United States Gulf States, Texas in particular. In his 
commentary, Professor McLaughlin examines the international trade issues 
and suggests a reevaluation of United States unilateral trade restrictions as 
a means of protecting marine living resources. 
I. OVERVIEW 
Professor Tarlock raises key points that are important when analyzing 
the synergism between United States and international environmental law . 
First, United States environmental law has often served as the international 
standard for the emerging regime of international environmental law. 
Conversely, the United States government has used weak domestic law to 
water down global treaties. Second, many domestic issues are linked to 
international issues, but the international dimension is often ignored. 
Because international environmental norms can be used to invalidate 
United States laws and regulations, the United States and state 
governments are on risky legal ground when they ignore or purposefully 
flout international law . Third, international law may impose duties on the 
United States beyond those adopted by Congress. As a corollary, 
domestic law that at' one time conformed to international law can be 
weakened by congressional amendment, thereby taking the United States 
out of compliance. Fourth, Professor Tarlock, in his Clean Air Act 
example, acknowledges congressional recognition that state governments 
have a role to play in implementing international law. 
Given the above, it is important to consider actions taken by state 
governments when we attempt to analyze how successfully the United 
States has harmonized domestic environmental law with international law . 
This issue was raised in earlier sessions and touched upon by Professor 
Tarlock in his paper. In the next two sections we will discuss it in the 
6. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, S. Treaty 
Doc. Nos. 95-1, Executive E, 100-3, 12 l.L.M. 1319, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating 
to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, op.!ned for signature June 
I, 1978, 17 l.L.M. 546 [hereinafter all references to the Convention, the Protocol and the Annexes 
will be cited as MARPOLj. 
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context of pollution control through the use of two examples: (1) a recent 
lawsuit initiated by tanker companies challenging the authority of the State 
of Washington to impose operation, management, and training regulations 
that are stricter than federal and international standards;7 and (2) Texas's 
role in the implementation of "specially protected areas" under 
MARPOL. 8 
II. INTERTANKO v. WASHINGTON9 
Professor Tarlock's analysis of a transboundary air pollution dispute 
between Canada and the United States represents a situation where 
international standards are used to strengthen domestic law. The converse 
can also occur, such as when Washington State implemented an inspection 
program for oil tankers that is stricter than international norms used by the 
Coast Guard. 
The purpose of Washington's tanker inspection program is to prevent 
oil spills in Washington's waters, particularly Puget Sound. Data gathered 
by the state demonstrated that the most effective way to prevent tanker 
spills is through enforcement of operational, management, and personnel 
training standards. After collecting information from the best tanker 
owners around the world, the state designed standards based upon the best 
achievable practices (BAP)-in other words, state of the art in the 
industry.1O One of the groups from which they solicited information was 
the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), 
a tanker association from Norway who instituted the lawsuit in federal 
district court in Washington State. II 
Interestingly, Intertanko did not challenge the standards themselves. 
Rather, they disputed Washington's ability to set and enforce standards that 
exceed international law standards and the standards used by the United 
States Coast Guard. They cited four international agreements and the 
Foreign Affairs, Supremacy, and Commerce Clauses of the United States 
7. See Intertanko v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996). 
8. MARPOL, supra note 6. 
9. The infonnation for this section was taken from telephone interviews with Nina Carter, staff 
member at the Washington Office of Marine Safety (May 6, 1996), and Bill Collins at the Solicitor-
General's office of the Washington Attorney-General. This infonnation is also derived from 
lntenanko, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996). 
10. Use of standards such as BAP is not uncommon in federal environmental law . See, e.g., 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); see also 
generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642. 
II. See lntertanko, 947 F. Supp. at 1488. Interestingly, the U.S. Coast Guard intervened on 
behalf of Intertanko. 
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Constitution to support their position. The international agreements are: 
the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SDLAS);12 
MARPOL;13 the International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW);14 and the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).15 
Essentially, Intertanko made a preemption or "federal occupation of the 
field" argument. Washington asserted in its defense that, under the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),16 Congress authorized states to implement 
programs more stringent than federal or international standards. Section 
2718(c) of OPA states that "nothing in this chapter ... shall in any way 
affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of . . . any State thereof 
. . . to impose additional liability or additional requirements . . . relating 
to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil." 17 
Washington argued that this provision, combined with the uncontested fact 
that their regulations are not in direct conflict with the federal rules, 
overcomes Intertanko's preemption argument. 
Three non-profit environmental groups, the Washington 
Environmental Council, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and 
Ocean Advocates, intervened on behalf of the State of Washington. 
Addressing the international law issue, they argued that the allegedly 
applicable conventional law is advisory only and not uniformly applied. 
They also asserted that international treaties are not binding on states, 
absent affirmative congressional action. Congressional action in this 
instance, they contended, is OPA, which affirmatively permits states to 
regulate more strictly. 
On November 18, 1996, Federal District Court Judge John C. 
Coughenour granted summary judgement to the State of Washington on all 
issues. As of early December, no appeal had been filed by Intertanko. 
Key factors in the Intertanko case were the savings clause in OPA and 
the court's characterization of the challenged standards as environmental 
regulation rather than shipping regulation. IS The court's interpretations of 
OPA's savings clause was critical to its conclusion that Congress did not 
12. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, June 17, 1960, T.LA.S. No. 5780, 
26 U.S.T. 185 (entered into force May 26, 1965). 
13. MARPOL, supra note 6. 
14. International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers, July 7, 1978, C.T.LA. No. 7624 (entered into force April 28, 1984) .. 
15. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 
1972, T.LA.S. No. 8587,28 U.S.T. 3459 (entered into force July 15, 1977). 
16. Oil Pollution Act of 1990,33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1995). 
17. Id. § 2718(c). 
18. Intertanko, 947 F. Supp. at 1491-93. 
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intend for the states to be limited by international treaty law:9 The court 
interpreted similar cases, decided by the United States Supreme Court20 
and the Ninth Circuit,21 as establishing differing standards, based upon the 
subject matter being regulated, for determining field preemption.22 State 
regulation of tanker design and construction is impliedly preempted; state 
regulation of water pollution or tanker operations arising from the 
particular characteristics of a local ecosystem are not subject to such 
implied preemption. 23 
This case represents' a strong victory for states who seek to give more 
stringent protection to valuable natural resources than is provided under 
international law. It also provides an important lesson for states: work 
diligently to include a savings clause in any federal legislation 
implementing international treaties pertaining to environmental protection 
if such a law could impact resources within your jurisdiction. 
III. TEXAS AND MARPOL 24 
In the trans boundary air pollution case discussed by Professor 
Tarlock, certain states, fearing negative economic repercussions, used their 
political influence to delay implementation of stricter sulphur dioxide 
standards. However, the State of Texas has done the opposite. It has 
used MARPOL to deal with a local problem created by international 
actors. Annex V of MARPOL, which regulates shipboard dumping of 
garbage at sea, prohibits the dumping of plastics anywhere in the ocean, 
but allows dumping of other wastes under certain circumstances.25 
Regulation 5 of Annex V prohibits dumping of any garbage in ocean 
19. See id. at 149 I -93. The court noted that Intertanko' s argument that the state regUlation was 
inconsistent with international law was undercut by Coast Guard regulations that impose requirements 
in addition to those mandated by international law. See id. at 1497. 
20. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co .• 435 U.S. l51 (1978). 
21. See Chevron U.S.A .• Inc. v. Hammond. 726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984). 
22. See Intertanko. 947 F. Supp. at 1493-95. 
23. See id. at 1495. 
24. This information was taken from a telephone interview with Miranda Wecker. former 
associate director of the Council on Ocean Law and member of the National Academy of Sciences 
Panel on Marine Debris (May 2. 1996). 
25. See MARPOL. supra note 6, at Annex V. Reg. 1(1). Regulation 1 of Annex V defines 
garbage to include "all kinds of victual. domestic and operational waste excluding fresh fish and parts 
thereof. generated during the normal operation of the ship and liable to be disposed of continuously 
or periodically except those substances which are defined or listed in other Annexes to the present 
Convention." Id. 
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waters designated as "special areas. ,,26 This ban takes effect only after 
adequate ports ide reception facilities are made available by parties whose 
coastlines border a special area. 27 
Frustrated by a growing marine debris problem on its beaches and the 
escalating costs to maintain clean beaches, the Texas Land Commissioner 
decided to seek designation of the Gulf of Mexico as a "special area" 
under MARPOL. He convinced Texas's congressional delegation to get 
the state a seat on the federal negotiating team and to persuade the 
executive branch to include the G':llf of Mexico's designation as a high 
priority item in the negotiations. Once on the team, the delegate played 
a key role in having the Gulf included in what became the "Caribbean 
special area." In addition, he was instrumental in securing a grant from 
the World Bank for Caribbean nations to support the construction of 
reception facilities so that the ban could go into effect. 
In this case, Texas, rather than ignoring international law, succeeded 
in using it as a powerful tool to help solve a serious pollution problem. 
IV. TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Professor Tarlock makes several interesting and cogent observations 
regarding the issue of restrictions on domestic environmental laws as a 
consequence of United States free trade obligations. He validly points out 
that United States environmental laws are subject to challenge and review 
under the dispute settlement provisions of the newly created WT028 and 
NAFTA.29 As an example, he discusses the well-known Tuna/Dolphin I 
and Tuna/Dolphin II dispute settlement decisions handed down under the 
auspices of GATT in 1991 and 1994.30 These decisions found that the 
United States violated GATT when it embargoed tuna imports from nations 
26. See id. at Annex V, Reg. 1(3). A "special area" is defined in Regulation I as "a sea area 
where for recognized technical reasons in relation to its oeanographical and ecological condition and 
to the particular character of its traffic the adoption of special mandatory methods for the prevention 
of sea pollution by garbage is required." [d. 
27. See id. at Annex V, Reg. 5(4). 
28. WTO, supra note 3, at Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1226. The WTO was established to 
supersede the institutionally amorphous General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 
[hereinafter GATT]. The WTO was fonnally established on January I, 1995. 
29. NAFTA, supra note 4. 
30. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Mexico 
v. U.S.), GATT Doc. D/S211R (Aug. 16, 1991), reprinted at 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter 
TunalDolphin 1]; GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
GATT Doc. DS29/R (June 16, 1994), reprinted at 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin 
II]. 
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that failed to comply with United States-mandated dolphin protection 
standards during tuna fishing operations in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. 
Among other findings, the panels criticized the United States for imposing 
embargoes against other nations "so as to force them to change their 
policies with respect to persons or things within their own jurisdiction. ,,31 
According to Professor Tarlock, the current WTO/GA TT trade 
regime frustrates the United States' efforts to improve global 
environmental quality as well as its ability to improve or maintain domestic 
environmental qUality. 32 He argues in favor of environmentally-motivated 
trade restrictions as long as they are not disguised protectionist measures. 33 
Because nations have little or no incentive to internalize the costs of global 
environmental degradation, he supports the use of "carrots" (such as 
subsidies and technology transfer arrangements) and "sticks" (including 
unilateral trade embargoes). 
Although a combination of carrots and sticks is probably the most 
effective method of protecting the global commons, Professor Tarlock 
underestimates the growing ability of nations targeted by United States 
trade restrictions to receive judicial redress. Until recently, nations subject 
to United States embargoes were unable to seek an enforceable 
adjudicatory remedy. For example, a challenge before the International 
Court of Justice or some other arbitral tribunal was not a viable option 
because it required consent from all of the contending parties. Moreover, 
a challenge under the dispute settlement provisions of GATT was rarely 
enforceable. 
This situation has significantly changed as a result of the establishment 
of the WTO on January 1, 1995. The newly created WTO dispute 
settlement regime is much more legalistic and less prone to political 
manipulation than was the old GATT regime.34 Most importantly, parties 
31. TunalDolphin II, supra note 30, at para. 5.24. 
32. Professor Tarlock uses a recent ruling by a WTO dispute panel that found regulations 
promulgated under the U.S. Clean Air Act discriminated against Brazilian and Venezuelan oil refiners 
as an example of how WTO/GA TT can weaken domestic environmental laws. See Tarlock, supra note 
I, at 780-81 (discussing 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996». For an analysis of the ruling, see Maury D. Shenk, 
United States-Standards for Reformulu.ted and Conventional Gasoline, 90 AM. I. INT'L L. 669 (1996). 
33. Professor Tarlock credits much of his argument to an analysis by Professor Howard F. 
Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.I. 
2131 (1995). 
34. The revised dispute settlement provisions may be found in Annex II of the Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). For 
a good explanation of the changes between the old GATT rules and new WTO rules, see Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. I. INT'L L. 
477 (1994). 
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to a dispute no longer have the ability to veto dispute settlement decisions. 
Rather than requiring a consensus of the parties to adopt a panel decision, 
as was the case under GATT, the new rules require consensus not to adopt 
a panel decision. In other words, in order for the United States to block 
a WTO dispute panel decision, it will have the almost impossible task of 
convincing all of the parties to the WTO, including the winning party, not 
to approve the decision. 
The serious impact of the new WTO system is easily illustrated by 
comparing the United States' reactions to the two Tuna/Dolphin holdings 
decided under the old GATT rules versus a recent ruling by a WTO 
dispute panel that found against the United States on an issue concerning 
the regulation of imported reformulated gasoline. Despite two 
unambiguous Tuna/Dolphin GATT panel rulings calling for the lifting of 
the tuna embargo, the United States has kept the embargo in place by 
simply blocking formal adoption of the GATT panel report. 35 In contrast, 
the Clinton administration has agreed to implement the WTO ruling in 
favor of Brazil· and Venezuela and to change its domestic environmental 
regulations concerning imported gasoline. The Administration was forced 
to implement the ruling or pay compensation because it was unable to 
convince all of the WTO member states to reject the ruling. 
In the future, it is increasingly likely that United States embargoes for 
marine conservation purposes will be challenged in the WTO and other 
international adjudicatory bodies.36 United States Public Law 101-162, 
which prohibits shrimp imports from countries that do not use sea turtle 
excluder devices (TEDs), provides a good case study of this trend. 37 After 
being hit with shrimp embargoes, four Asian nations (India, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, and Thailand) filed a formal complaint in the WTO on October 
8, 1996, seeking consultations with the United States. If consultations fail, 
35. A 1996 congressional bill implementing the so-called Panama Declaration between the 
United States and a number of Latin American nations, which would have lifted the tuna embargo, was 
recently defeated in the U. S. Senate. Consequently, the embargo remains in place five years after the 
first GATT Tuna/Dolphin decision. See Dori Meinert, Senate Tuna Bill Blocked by Boxer, SAN DIEGO 
UNION TRIBUNE; Oct. 4, 1996, at Cl. 
36. For example, if the U.S. were to become a party, U.S. trade restrictions may be subject 
to challenge under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. See U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 
62/122 (Dec. 10, 1982), reprinted in 21 LL.M. 1261 (1992); see also Richard J. Mclaughlin, 
UNCLOS and the Demise of the United States' Use of Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea 
Turtles, Whales, and Other International Marine Living Resources, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1994). 
37. See Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, The JUdiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 1990, § 609,16 U.S.C. § 1537 note (Conservation of Sea Turtles; Importation 
of Shrimp) (1994). The most recent guidelines for implementing the Act may be found at 61 Fed. 
Reg. 17,342 (1996). 
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a full dispute panel will convene. 38 Should a WTO dispute panel hear the 
claim, there is a strong possibility that the United States will again be 
found in violation of the trade agreement. Moreover, as in the 
reformulated gasoline decision, a WTO ruling may require the United 
States to change its domestic environmental laws or pay compensatory 
damages. 
In light of the changes brought about by the dispute settlement 
provisiOns in the WTO and other international environmental and trade 
agreements, it is time for the United States to reevaluate its use of 
unilateral trade restrictions as a method of protecting marine living 
resources. 39 The United States needs to face the fact that its embargoes 
may not be as effective as in the past because targeted nations now have 
access to binding adjudicatory forums never before available. In response, 
the United States needs to be more willing to compromise with other 
nations and to place more emphasis on negotiating bilateral, regional, and 
global conservation treaties rather. than relying so heavily on unilateral 
trade restrictions. Professor Tarlock correctly asserts that there is still a 
place for sticks in the United States arsenal. However, because these 
sticks are getting smaller every year, the United States must be prepared 
to find a more balanced and thoughtful method of using them. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we commend Professor Tarlock on his excellent 
presentation of some of the critical issues raised in the interaction between 
international environmental law and United States federal and state 
pollution control law . As with most areas of the law, there are few bright 
lines to guide the lawyers or their clients. For scholars, on the other 
hand, the area is ripe for thoughtful and critical commentary. We hope 
that more conferences such as this one will be held in the future to foster 
such discussion and commentary. 
38. See Robert Evans, Asian States Launch WTO Shrimp Case Against U.S., THE REUTER 
BUSINESS REPORT, Oct. 8,1996. 
39. There is some hope that the WTO will become more envir~nmentally friendly as a result 
of future work by the Committee on Trade and Environment. See Trade and EilVironment, Ministerial 
Decision of 14 April 1994; see also WTO, supra note 3, at 1267-69. To date, very few tangible 
accomplishments have emerged from the Trade and Environment Committee. 
